Who won the suez crisis

On 27 July 1956, Britain began to prepare an invasion force. When joined by two French divisions from Algeria, this would number 80,000 men. 

On 2 August, 20,000 British reservists were called up, primarily to help provide the logistic support that such a force would need.

The operation was hampered from the very start by a severe lack of resources. There were insufficient ships and landing craft. And, when it was decided to add armour to the force, a shortage of transporters meant that the tanks had to be moved to their embarkation points by a commercial removals firm.

The original plan was to land at Alexandria and send an armoured column towards Cairo before heading for the canal at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez. This operation was planned to start on 15 September and was expected to be over in eight days. 

However, the shortage of landing craft caused the plan to be changed to an assault on Port Said followed by a drive down the canal. 

Meanwhile, Britain had agreed to a French plan that had been secretly hatched with the Israelis. Israel would invade Sinai, distracting Nasser and allowing Britain and France to occupy the canal in the guise of peacemakers.

On 29 October 1956, the Israelis invaded Sinai. Britain and France, as members of the United Nations Security Council, called for a ceasefire and the demilitarisation of the canal.

When Nasser refused to comply, the operation began with Allied air attacks neutralising the Egyptian Air Force. On 5 November, 3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment seized the airfield at El Gamil, while French paratroopers took Port Fuad. 

The seaborne invasion began at 4.30am the following day. Royal Marine Commandos, supported by tanks, came ashore by landing craft, while other Marines were transported into action by helicopter. This was the first time such a tactic had been used. 

By the end of the day, 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment, along with more tanks, had been landed and the Allies were moving rapidly down the canal, brushing aside what little Egyptian resistance they encountered.

From a military point of view, the operation was going remarkably well. However, Britain and France were unprepared for the diplomatic storm their actions had provoked.

International pressure - especially from the United States, who feared an escalation of the conflict and Soviet intervention - brought the operation to a premature end. US President Dwight Eisenhower believed that if the US went along with the attack on Egypt, the resulting backlash might also push Arab states into the Soviet fold.

The British financial system was also under strain. Its currency was under sustained attack during the crisis and Britain's oil supply had been damaged by the canal’s closure.

The British asked for a loan from the International Monetary Fund, but the Americans refused it unless a ceasefire was agreed. They also threated to sell the US government's sterling bond holdings, which could devalue the pound and undermine Britain’s foreign exchange reserves.

In addition to this financial pressure, the British government faced large public protest against the conflict.

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On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, the joint British-French enterprise which had owned and operated the Suez Canal since its construction in 1869. Nasser’s announcement came about following months of mounting political tensions between Egypt, Britain, and France. Although Nasser offered full economic compensation for the Company, the British and French Governments, long suspicious of Nasser’s opposition to the continuation of their political influence in the region, were outraged by the nationalization. The Egyptian leader, in turn, resented what he saw as European efforts to perpetuate their colonial domination.

The Eisenhower administration, worried by the prospect of the outbreak of hostilities between its NATO allies and an emergent, influential Middle Eastern power (and the possible intervention of the Soviet Union in such a conflict), attempted to broker a diplomatic settlement of the British-French-Egyptian dispute. On September 9, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proposed the creation of a Suez Canal Users’ Association (SCUA), an international consortium of 18 of the world’s leading maritime nations, to operate the Canal. Although SCUA would have given Britain, France, and Egypt an equal stake in the Canal, this, and various other U.S. and international mediation efforts failed to win the full support of any of the contending powers.

In discussions with the United States between August and October, the British Government repeatedly hinted that it might resort to force in dealing with Nasser. At the same time, the British and French held secret military consultations with Israel, who regarded Nasser as a threat to its security, resulting in the creation of a joint plan to invade Egypt and overthrow its President. In keeping with these plans, Israeli forces attacked across Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula on October 29, 1956, advancing to within 10 miles of the Suez Canal. Under the pretext of protecting the Canal from the two belligerents, Britain and France landed troops of their own a few days later.

In response, the Eisenhower administration, concerned about dissociating the United States from European colonialism—especially in light of its strident condemnation of the Soviet intervention in Hungary the same week—as well as the possibility that the Soviets would intervene to assist Nasser, pressured Britain and France to accept a United Nations ceasefire on November 6. Moreover, the United States voted for U.N. resolutions publicly condemning the invasion and approving the creation of a U.N. peacekeeping force. Washington’s public censure of two of its most important allies temporarily soured relations with London and Paris and helped contribute to the resignation of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden in January 1957. Concurrently, U.S. worries about the continued viability of European (particularly British) political and military power in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis prompted the creation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which gave the administration increased power to aid countries in the region. By March 1957, however, the U.S.–U.K. bilateral relationship had recovered under Eden’s successor, Harold Macmillan.

The 1956 Suez Crisis, when Britain along with France and Israel invaded Egypt to recover control of the Suez Canal, was arguably one of the most significant episodes in post-1945 British history. Its outcome highlighted Britain’s declining status and confirmed it as a ‘second tier’ world power. Domestically it caused a massive political fallout in Britain and resulted in an economic crisis, while internationally it further complicated the politics of the Middle East, threatening Britain’s key diplomatic relationships with Commonwealth nations and the United States-United Kingdom ‘special relationship’.

On 4 November the United Nations threatened Britain with sanctions if there were any civilian casualties from British aerial bombing of targets in Egypt. This led to economic panic in the first week of November 1956 and resulted in tens of millions of pounds being lost from the country’s reserves. Britain faced having to devalue its currency. Appalled that military operations had begun without his knowledge, US President Eisenhower put pressure on the International Monetary Fund to deny Britain any financial assistance. With few options the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden reluctantly accepted a UN proposed ceasefire. Under Resolution 1001 on 7 November 1956 the United Nations deployed an emergency force (UNEF) of peacekeepers into Egypt to halt the conflict. It had lasted just two days and Britain, and Eden personally, had been left humiliated.

The crisis had a serious impact on Britain’s international relationships. Eisenhower regarded Suez as an unnecessary distraction from the Soviet Union’s brutal suppression of an uprising in Hungary. Several recently independent former-British colonies agreed. Only Australia supported Britain, while Pakistan threatened to leave the Commonwealth. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev attacked ‘British imperialism’, threatening to attack London with rockets, as well as sending troops to Egypt, potentially dragging NATO into the conflict.

Within Britain the conflict divided opinion. The Conservative government faced significant hostility from the Labour opposition and even experienced division in its own party. Intervention in Suez was initially popular with the British public, but following the humiliation caused by the conflict the government rapidly lost the support of the country. Nation-wide anti-war protests sprung up and several civil servants resigned in protest. 

What Britain had hoped to prevent by the actions in November 1956, it actually succeeded in guaranteeing. Egypt maintained control of the canal with the support of the United Nations and the United States. The canal was closed to traffic for five months by ships sunk by the Egyptians during the operations. British access to fuel and oil became limited and resulted in shortages. Petrol rationing was introduced in December 1956, lasting until May 1957. Under huge domestic pressure and suffering ill-health Eden resigned in January 1957, less than two years after becoming prime minister.

As Eisenhower had feared, the Suez Crisis also increased Soviet influence over Egypt. Khrushchev’s intervention on the side of Egypt placed the Soviet Union as the natural friend of Arab nations. It emboldened Arab nationalists and spurred the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to aid rebel groups seeking independence in British territories across the Middle East.