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How the interactions among the firm’s owners, managers, and employees influence wages, work, and profits, and how this affects the entire economy
Apple’s iPhone and iPad are iconic American hi-tech products, yet neither is assembled in the US. Until 2011 a single company, Foxconn, produced every iPhone and iPad in factories in China, mainly so that Apple could take advantage of lower costs, including wages. The components of the iPhone and iPad for the most part do not come from China, but are sourced from around the world. Components such as the flash memory, display module, and touch screen are made by a number of different companies including Toshiba and Sharp in Japan. The microprocessor is made by Samsung in South Korea and other components, by Infineon in Germany. Like other firms, Apple makes profits by finding the supplier that can provide inputs at the lowest cost, whether the input is a component or labour, wherever in the world that supplier may be located. The cost of assembling the components into the final product in China is small—making up only 4% of the total cost—compared to the cost of components sourced from high-wage economies such as Germany and Japan. Almost half of Apple’s employees in the US sell Apple products rather than making them, while firms compete on a global scale to win the lucrative business of supplying Apple with its components. The cost of producing the iPhone is far lower than the price Apple charges: in 2016, a 32Gb iPhone 7 cost $224.80 to manufacture. Its price in the US was $649. offshoringThe relocation of part of a firm’s activities outside of the national boundaries in which it operates. It can take place within a multinational company or may involve outsourcing production to other firms.Apple is not alone in outsourcing (or offshoring) production to countries that are not the main market for the goods produced. In most manufacturing industries, firms based in rich countries have transferred a significant proportion of production, which was previously done by local employees, to poorer countries where wages are lower. But Apple and other firms are looking for more than cheap labour. Wages in some of Apple’s source countries such as Germany are higher than in the US. Other industries, particularly garment manufacturing, have relocated primarily to low-wage economies. More than 97% of apparel and 98% of footwear sold in the US by American brands and retailers is made overseas. China, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Vietnam are now among the world’s main exporters of textiles and clothing. At the time of the Industrial Revolution, the world’s largest exporter was Britain. Also, in developing countries, additional business costs such as health and safety rules are far lower, and environmental regulations are often less strict. firmEconomic organization in which private owners of capital goods hire and direct labour to produce goods and services for sale on markets to make a profit.Apple, Samsung, and Toshiba are business organizations called firms. Not everyone is employed in a firm. For example, many farmers, carpenters, software developers or personal trainers work independently, as neither employee nor employer. While some people work for governments and not-for-profit organizations, the majority of people in rich nations make their living by working in a firm. Firms are major actors in the economy and we will use this and the next unit to explain how they work. A firm is often referred to as if it were a person: we talk about ‘the price Apple charges’. But while firms are actors—and in some legal systems are treated as if they were individuals—firms are also the stage on which the people who make up the firm (employees, managers, and owners) act out their sometimes common but sometimes competing interests. In our ‘Economist in action’ video Richard Freeman, an economist who specializes in labour markets, explains some of the consequences of outsourcing for these actors. To understand the firm, we will model how employers set wages and employees respond. We have already seen, in earlier units, the importance of work, and firms, in the economy:
We illustrated each of these conclusions using models that illuminate some aspects of the economy, while setting aside others. In Unit 2, we did not consider how the length of the working day was determined while the economy was growing. In Unit 3, we did not model how the wage or the marginal rate of transformation of free time into goods was determined when we analysed a decision on working hours. In Unit 2 we told a story of conflicting interests over wages, but we did not model strategic interaction and bargaining until Units 4 and 5. And in Unit 5 we used the story of just two (imaginary) people called Bruno and Angela to model how bargaining may affect the Pareto efficiency and fairness of allocations. In this unit, we study how, in the modern capitalist economy, the coordination of labour takes place within firms. We model how wages are determined when there are conflicts of interest between employers and employees, and look at what this means for the sharing of the mutual gains that arise from cooperation in a firm. In Unit 7, we look at the firm as an actor in its relationship with other firms and with its customers. 6.1 Firms, markets, and the division of labourThe economy is made up of people doing different things, for example producing Apple display modules or making clothing for export. Producing display modules also involves many distinct tasks, done by different employees within Toshiba or Sharp, the companies that make them for Apple. division of labourThe specialization of producers to carry out different tasks in the production process. Also known as: specialization.Setting aside the work done in families, in a capitalist economy, the division of labour is coordinated in two major ways: firms and markets. Among the institutions of modern capitalist economies, the firm rivals the government in importance. John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge explain how this happened. John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge. 2003. The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea. New York, NY: Modern Library. Why do firms work the way they do? For example, why do the owners of the firm hire the workers, rather than the other way around? Randall Kroszner and Louis Putterman summarize this field of economics. Randall S. Kroszner and Louis Putterman (editors). 2009. The Economic Nature of the Firm: A Reader. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
So in this unit we study firms. In the units to follow, we study markets. Herbert Simon, an economist, used the view from Mars to explain why it is important to study both. Imagine a visitor approaching Earth from Mars, Herbert ‘Herb’ Simon (1916–2001) urged his readers. Looking at Earth through a telescope that revealed social structure, what would our visitor see? Companies might appear as green fields, he suggested, divisions and departments as faint contours within. Connecting these fields, red lines of buying and selling. Within these fields, blue lines of authority, connecting boss and employee, foreman and assembly-worker, mentor and mentee. The coordination of workThe way that labour is coordinated within firms is different to coordination through markets:
The prices that motivate and constrain people’s actions in a market are the result of the actions of thousands or millions of individuals, not a decision by someone in authority. The idea of private property specifically limits the things a government or anyone else can do with your possessions. In a firm, by contrast, owners or their managers direct the activities of their employees, who may number in the thousands or even millions. The managers of Walmart, the world’s largest retailer, decide on the activities of 2.2 million employees, a larger number of people than any army in world history before the nineteenth century. Walmart is an exceptionally large firm, but it is not exceptional in that it brings together a large number of people who work together in a way coordinated (by the management) to make profits. Unlike flash mobs, firms do not form spontaneously and then disappear. Like any organization, firms have a decision-making process and ways of imposing their decisions on the people in it. When we say that ‘Apple outsourced its component production’ or ‘the firm sets a price of $10.75’, we mean that the decision-making process in the firm resulted in these actions.3 Figure 6.1 shows a simplified picture of the firm’s actors and decision-making structure.
Adam Smith, writing at the birth of capitalism in the eighteenth century, was to become its most famous advocate. Karl Marx (1818–1883), who watched capitalism mature in the industrial towns of England, was to become its most famous critic. Born in Prussia (now part of Germany), he attended the local classical high school, which was celebrated for its ethos of enlightened liberalism. In 1842 he became a writer and editor for the Rheinische Zeitung, a liberal newspaper, which was then closed by the government, after which he moved to Paris and met Friedrich Engels, with whom he collaborated in writing The Communist Manifesto (1848). Marx then moved to London in 1849. At first, Marx and his wife Jenny lived in poverty. He earned money by writing about political events in Europe for the New York Tribune. Marx saw capitalism as just the latest in a succession of economic arrangements in which people have lived since prehistory. Inequality was not unique to capitalism, he observed—slavery, feudalism, and most other economic systems had shared this feature—but capitalism also generated perpetual change and growth in output.6 He was the first economist to understand why the capitalist economy was the most dynamic in human history. Perpetual change arose, Marx observed, because capitalists could survive only by introducing new technologies and products, finding ways of lowering costs, and by reinvesting their profits into businesses that would perpetually grow. This, he claimed, inevitably caused conflict between employers and workers. Buying and selling goods in an open market is a transaction between equals: nobody is in a position to order anyone else to buy or sell. In the labour market, in which owners of capital are buyers and workers are the sellers, the appearance of freedom and equality was, to Marx, an illusion. Employers did not buy the employee’s work, because this cannot be purchased, as we have seen in this unit. Instead, the wage allowed the employer to rent the worker and to command workers inside the firm. Workers were not inclined to disobey because they might lose their jobs and join the ‘reserve army’ of the unemployed (the phrase that Marx used in his 1867 work, Capital). Marx thought that the power wielded by employers over workers was a core defect of capitalism.7
Marx also had influential views on history, politics, and sociology. He thought that history was decisively shaped by the interactions between scarcity, technological progress, and economic institutions, and that political conflicts arose from conflicts about the distribution of income and the organization of these institutions. He thought that capitalism, by organizing production and allocation in anonymous markets, created atomized individuals instead of integrated communities. In recent years, economists have returned to themes in Marx’s work to help explain economic crises. These themes include the firm as an arena of conflict and of the exercise of power (this unit), the role of technological progress (Unit 1 and Unit 2), and the problems created by inequality (Unit 19). piece-rate workA type of employment in which the worker is paid a fixed amount for each unit of the product made.Why is it not possible for firms just to pay employees according to how productive they are? For example, paying employees at a clothing factory $2 for each garment they finish. This method of payment, known as piece rate, provides the employee with an incentive to exert effort, because employees take home more pay if they make more garments. In the late nineteenth century the pay of more than half of US manufacturing workers was based on their output, but piece rates are not widely used in modern economies. At the turn of the twenty-first century less than 5% of manufacturing workers in the US were paid piece rates and, beyond the manufacturing sector, piece rates are used even less often.8 Why do most of today’s firms not use this simple method to induce high effort from their employees?
If piece rates are not practical, then what other method could a firm use to induce high effort from workers? How could the firm provide an incentive to do the job well, even though the worker is paid for time and not output? Just as the owners of the firm protect their interests by linking management pay to the firm’s share price, the manager uses incentives so that employees will work effectively.
Which of the following are reasons why employment contracts are incomplete?
6.4 Employment rentsThere are many reasons why people put in a good day’s work. For many people, doing a good job is its own reward, and doing anything else would contradict their work ethic. Even for those not intrinsically motivated to work hard, feelings of responsibility for other employees or for one’s employer may provide strong work motivation. For some employees, hard work is a way to reciprocate a feeling of gratitude to the employer for providing a job with good working conditions. In other cases, firms identify teams of workers whose output is readily measured—for example, the percentage of on-time departures for airline staff—and pay a benefit to the whole group that is divided among team members. But in the background, there is another reason to do a good job: the fear of being fired, or of missing the opportunity to be promoted into a position that has higher pay and greater job security. Laws and practices concerning the termination of employment for cause (that is, because of inadequate or low quality work, not due to insufficient demand for the firm’s product) differ among countries. In some countries, the owners of the firm have the right to fire a worker whenever they choose, while in others, dismissal is difficult and costly. But even in these cases, an employee has to fear the consequences of not working up to the employer’s desired standards. Such a worker, for example, would be unlikely to achieve a position in the firm where she could count on remaining employed when lower demand for the firm’s products results in other workers being dismissed. Do workers care whether they lose their jobs? employment rentThe economic rent a worker receives when the net value of her job exceeds the net value of her next best alternative (that is, being unemployed). Also known as: cost of job loss.If firms paid their employees the lowest wages they would be willing to accept, the answer would be no. Such a wage would make the worker indifferent between remaining in the job and losing it. But in practice most workers care very much. There is a difference between the value of the job (taking into account all the benefits and costs it entails) and the value of the next best option—which is being unemployed and having to search for a new job. In other words, there is an employment rent. Employment rents can benefit owners and managers in two ways:
We can use the same reasoning in the employment of managers by the owners of the firm. The main reason owners wield power over managers is that they can fire them, and so eliminate their managerial employment rents.
Counting the cost of job lossRecall that an economic rent measures the value of a situation—for example, having your current job—compared to what you would get if the current situation were no longer possible. To calculate employment rent—or in other words, the net cost of job loss—we need to weigh up all the benefits and costs of working compared with being unemployed and searching for another job. There are some costs of working, such as:
But there are many benefits, which would be lost if you lost your job:
Even confining attention to the loss in wages, the cost is high. But how do we measure how high it is?
In which of the following employment situations would the employment rent be high, ceteris paribus?
6.5 Determinants of the employment rentTo construct a model of how employment rents may be used to motivate employees to work hard, we consider Maria, an employee earning $12 an hour for a 35-hour working week. To determine her economic rent, we need to think how she would evaluate two aspects of her job:
Using the concept of utility introduced in Unit 3, we can say that Maria’s utility is increased by the goods and services she can buy with her wage, but reduced by the unpleasantness of going to work and working hard all day—the disutility of work. Her disutility of work depends on how much effort she puts into her job. Suppose she spends half of her working time actually working, and half doing other things like checking Facebook. We represent this as an effort level of 0.5. Working this hard is equivalent to a cost of $2 per hour to Maria. To calculate her employment rent we first find her net utility of working and earning $12, compared with being unemployed and earning nothing: This is her employment rent per hour. The total employment rent (or cost of job loss), depends on how long she expects to remain unemployed. We will suppose that if she loses her job she can expect to remain unemployed for 44 weeks before finding another. The analysis in Figure 6.2 shows how to calculate the rent.
John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) was one of the most important philosophers and economists of the nineteenth century. His book On Liberty (1859) parallels Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations in advocating limits on governmental powers, and is still an influential argument in favour of individual freedom and privacy. Mill thought that the structure of the typical firm was an affront to freedom and individual autonomy. In The Principles of Political Economy (1848), Mill described the relationship between firm owners and workers as an unnatural one: ‘To work at the bidding and for the profit of another, without any interest in the work … is not, even when wages are high, a satisfactory state to human beings of educated intelligence,’ he wrote.20 21 Attributing the conventional employer-employee relationship to the poor education of the working class, he predicted that the spread of education, and the political empowerment of working people, would change this situation:
6.10 Principals and agents: Interactions under incomplete contractsIn the relationship between Maria and her employer, Maria’s work effort matters to both parties but is not covered by the employment contract. This leads to the existence of employment rents. If they had been able to write a complete contract, the situation would have been quite different. The employer could have offered her an enforceable contract specifying both the wage and the exact level of effort she should provide, and if these terms were acceptable to her, she would have agreed and worked as required. To maximize his profit he would have chosen a contract that was only just acceptable, so she would not have earned any rents. This example is not unusual. In practice, all employment relationships are governed by incomplete contracts. Employment contracts often do not even bother to mention that the worker should work hard and well. And there are many other ways in which we interact without a complete contract:
For these and a great many other exchanges, it appears that Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), the founder of modern sociology, was right when he observed that ‘not everything in the contract is contractual.’ As above, there is usually something that matters to at least one of the parties that cannot be written down in an enforceable contract. Why are contracts incomplete?Thinking about some examples of economic interactions, we can see that there are several reasons for the absence of a complete contract:
Principal–agent modelsprincipal–agent relationshipThis relationship exists when one party (the principal) would like another party (the agent) to act in some way, or have some attribute that is in the interest of the principal, and that cannot be enforced or guaranteed in a binding contract. See also: incomplete contract. Also known as: principal–agent problem.Many contractual relationships can be modelled in the same way, as a game between two players, whom we call the principal and the agent, who face a conflict of interest. These are known as principal–agent problems. In the case of Maria and her employer, the employer is the principal. He would like to offer Maria, the agent, an employment contract, and she wants the job, but the amount of effort she will provide cannot be specified in the contract because it is not verifiable. This is a problem because there is a conflict of interest: he would prefer her to work hard, whereas Maria prefers an easy life. Our model of Maria’s employment is an example of a general class of principal–agent models, in which an action taken by the agent is ‘hidden’ from the principal, or ‘unobservable’.
In short: a hidden action problem occurs when there is a conflict of interest between the principal and the agent over some action that may be taken by the agent, and this action cannot be subjected to a complete contract. In these problems, information about the action is either asymmetric (the agent knows what action is taken, but the principal doesn’t) or unverifiable (it cannot be used by a court to enforce a contract). The table in Figure 6.8 identifies the principals and agents in the examples from this section.
We study the banker-borrower principal–agent model in Unit 10. In Unit 12 we will introduce the second main class of principal–agent models, in which it is not the agent’s action that cannot be contracted (hidden action) but rather something about the agent herself that is unknown to the principal (hidden attribute).
6.11 ConclusionThe products of people’s labour may be transferred to others in markets, or within firms through employment contracts. To understand the role of the firm, we view it not only as an actor, but also a stage on which three sets of actors (owners, managers, and employees) interact. Principal–agent models help us understand how firms work by identifying the consequences of the conflicts of interest between the actors, when these cannot be resolved by complete contracts. Employment contracts are incomplete: they can cover hours and some working conditions, but not the effort provided by the employee, which is not verifiable. So employers set wages that are higher than workers’ reservation wages. Workers receive an employment rent, which motivates them to work hard and deters them from quitting. When all employers set wages in this way, there will be involuntary unemployment in the economy. Public policies such as the provision of unemployment benefits change workers’ reservation wages and best response curves, and so affect the wage-setting process.
6.12 References
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